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developed today is certainly not optimal,
would Cambone’s system be better?
Despite his failure to consider the second
and third-order effects of enacting the
system he proposes, Cambone provides
the basis for a great academic discussion
over future national security policy and
how it is developed. It is a topic that needs
to be discussed, and as the author has
emphatically pointed out, the time is
now. This point is hard to refute. As the
world’s sole remaining superpower, and
as the debate and divergence over how
policy gets developed becomes stronger,
the United States must reflect on how to
improve its national security decision
making structure.
In sum, Cambone and his colleagues
have provided a good point of departure
for a debate on how the United States
should develop and implement future
national security policy. There are many
things to consider, and this book will get
us started.
CHARLES NEIMEYER
Naval War College
O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the
Future of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution Press, 2000. 208pp. $42.95
Over the past several years, the U.S. mil-
itary has officially embraced the idea
that rapidly evolving technologies soon
will lead to a profound change in the
conduct of warfare. The need to inno-
vate in response to a prospective revolu-
tion in military affairs is the central
theme of Joint Vision 2010 and similar
force-planning documents. Some stud-
ies, such as the congressionally man-
dated National Defense Panel, have
concluded that only immediate and
radical transformation to new systems,
new operational concepts, and new or-
ganizations will enable the U.S. military
to retain its battlefield dominance.
Michael O’Hanlon, however, is not con-
vinced. In his view, most calls for trans-
formation lack any systematic or rigorous
analysis of how emerging technologies
might specifically change the character of
combat in the coming decades. Thus the
goal of this book is to provide realistic
projections of technological possibilities
that offer a better idea of how the U.S.
military might best proceed in future re-
search and acquisition.
O’Hanlon examines a wide range of
militarily relevant technologies, in two
broad categories: those primarily elec-
tronic (sensors, computers, and communi-
cations), and those primarily mechanical
(vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons).
From this survey he offers an evaluation
of where evolving technologies are likely
to provide new capabilities over the next
two decades, and where significant force
limitations are likely to remain.
In the realm of electronics, O’Hanlon
expects continued advances in computers
and communications but foresees no im-
minent breakthrough in sensors that will
significantly improve one’s ability to de-
tect and track the adversary’s activity. He
specifically rejects the idea that the bat-
tlefield can be rendered “transparent.”
On the mechanical side, he sees no
near-term developments that will allow
maneuver and strike forces to become
sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or
stealthy to allow profound improvements
in speed of movement or lethality. Thus
he concludes that proponents of trans-
formation provide neither a compelling
case for a near-term revolution in warfare
nor any adequate idea of what the mili-
tary should be transforming itself into.
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O’Hanlon’s general projections of future
technologies appear reasonable. Yet the
reader would be more assured of the au-
thor’s conclusions if his technical evalua-
tions did not rely so heavily upon articles
in newspapers and popular periodicals.
One can be justifiably skeptical that infor-
mation drawn from Army Times, Defense
News, or even Aviation Week & Space
Technology fully reflects the broad range
of scientific research and development
throughout government, industry, and aca-
demia, both in the United States and
abroad. Likewise, O’Hanlon’s general dis-
missal of the future military challenges
posed by China, Russia, and North Korea
is somewhat cavalier. It would have been
useful had O’Hanlon made clear his per-
sonal qualifications to provide an author-
itative evaluation of such a wide range of
technology projections and foreign military
developments. He states that he presented
his findings to “a number of weapons sci-
entists and technology experts,” but he
does not identify them or indicate
whether they agreed with his conclusions.
O’Hanlon uses his projections of future
technology as the basis for a moderniza-
tion strategy that is intended to promote
“defense innovation” without increasing
the defense budget. He proposes major
reductions, up to two-thirds in such “ex-
pensive next generation platforms” as the
F-22 and F/A-18E/F, in order to fund im-
provements to existing systems and a
broad range of initiatives in research, de-
velopment, and experimentation. How-
ever, most of his recommendations tend
to be as vague as the assumptions he is
challenging. For instance, O’Hanlon ap-
proves of the acquisition of “new fleets
of unmanned aerial vehicles,” because it
“appear[s] generally sensible.” He states
that up to two billion dollars a year might
be needed to outfit combat units with
“internet capabilities” but does not make
clear whether he is referring to the com-
mercial Internet, classified information
networks, or some other type of equip-
ment-interoperability initiative. Likewise,
he makes a broad plea for the military to
“avoid service parochialism and foster
jointness” but does not elaborate on how
best to balance the advantages of organiza-
tional unity (as distinguished from systems
interoperability) against the important con-
tribution of interservice competition to the
process of military innovation.
O’Hanlon’s basic thesis is certainly valid.
As he points out, the fact that none of the
military services has actually committed
to major changes in its force structures,
operational concepts, or organizations is
evidence in itself that proponents of in-
novation have yet to articulate a compel-
ling argument for a very different U.S.
military. This book is far from the final
word on military technology and trans-
formation, but it may serve to stimulate
the proponents of major change to en-
gage in a more detailed debate.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and Da-
vid R. Segal, eds. The Postmodern Military: Armed
Forces after the Cold War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2000. 286pp. $45
Ask a soldier or military analyst to de-
scribe the “postmodern military,” and
you are likely to get an answer that includes
high technology, precision weapons, infor-
mation operations, and possibly (espe-
cially if he or she is associated with the
Navy) network-centric warfare. Much of
the recent literature on military affairs
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